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ABSTRACT
Two of the most frequently heard descriptions of the retail industry today are "over-
stored" and "consolidation". The most common explanations for these phenomenon are
that during the past decade, a more time-pressed, savings conscious, value-oriented, and
multi-ethnic America has demanded superior value and convenience from retailers
resulting in tremendous pressure on profit margins and record retail failures. Retailers
lacking access to capital, buying savvy, efficient distribution and inventory systems and
pricing leverage with suppliers are unable to compete with the Walmarts, Home Depots
and other "Category Killers" of the world which possess these advantages.
This thesis analyzes the current outlook of major publicly traded (and two major private)
"distressed" retailers operating in Eastern Massachusetts. Among the topics covered are
the amount of space they occupy in relation to the total market(s), the formats they
operate in, the likelihood of their space becoming vacant, the potential for re-use of this
space by Walmart, Target and other "growth" retailers and the implications of these issues
for the retail property markets in eastern Massachusetts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Objective:
This thesis first studies changes in the demographic makeup of our country and the
ensuing emergence and financial performance of "category killers" and other dominant
retailers in various segments of retailing. A particular emphasis is made in the home
improvement, consumer electronics and discount department stores segments. The effect
of this evolution in terms of the ongoing consolidation of retailers, the decline in the
market share of department stores, other general merchandisers and the mall as a retailing
venue are discussed.
The extent to which retailers in these three segments which operate in eastern
Massachusetts are subject to the same trends observed at the national level is then
analyzed. The analysis then focuses exclusively on the current outlook of four major
publicly traded (and two major private) discount department stores retailers operating in
eastern Massachusetts. Among the topics covered are the amount of space they occupy in
relation to the total market, the formats they operate in, a projection of how much of this
space is "excess selling space" (in light of their inability to compete effectively in this new
environment) and therefore is likely to become vacant, the potential for re-use of this
space by Walmart, Target and other growing retailers and the implications of these issues
for the retail property markets in eastern Massachusetts.
Methodology:
One of the key objectives of this paper is to estimate the amount of "excess selling space"
currently being occupied by distressed discount department store retailers in the eastern
Massachusetts region and secondly, to predict the increase in the amount of this excess
space over the next six years as Walmart increases its presence in the region and Target
makes its predicted entry. This analysis depends heavily on the development of a model
which utilizes the company-wide sales productivity of national and regional discounters,
adjusted for regional factors, to estimate total discount department store sales for the
state of Massachusetts.
A key assumption heavily relied on in this analysis is the observed historical increase in
productivity experienced by Walmart stores during their "life cycle" and the assumption
that this increase in store productivity occurs in this region despite the stiff competition
that currently exists. The growth in total sales and the share of those sales captured by
each of the major chains is then estimated. Next, an analysis is performed which estimates
the sales levels which the various retailers must achieve to obtain a healthy operating
margin of 4.50%. The current sales productivity of the regional discounters and the
required sales to achieve healthy margins are then used to determine the ultimate output of
the model- the amount of "excess selling space" (i.e. the required reduction in the amount
of gross selling area needed to restore a healthy balance of between total sales and total
selling area).
Another key objective is to analyze the potential for reuse of this space. As a precursor to
this analysis, the characteristics of the shopping centers which these retailers occupy are
discussed, as they will have a direct bearing on the effects of store closings and the types
of retailers which could potentially occupy this space. Next, the recent historical reuse of
discount department store space is analyzed, particularly the status and reuse of stores
vacated by Stuart's Department Stores and Ames (including Zayre) in the past few years.
Finally, a look at the prospect of Walmart, Target and other category killers reusing this
space is analyzed.
Summary Conclusions:
On the national level, a significant consolidation is clearly underway with Walmart, Home
Depot and Circuit City entrenched as obvious winners in their respective segments. The
outlook for the second tier of retailers in these segments is less certain. While Lowe's is a
relatively strong company in the home improvement segment, the outlook for Kmart and
Best Buy, in the discount department store and consumer electronics segments, are
unclear. Kmart suffers from low store sales productivity and both companies have seen
their gross profit margin seriously eroded in the past year.
Retailers in these segments operating in eastern Massachusetts are now experiencing these
same trends of consolidation and extreme competitive pressure. In the past year,
four regional discount department store chains with aggregate sales of approximately $4.7
billion and 85 stores in Massachusetts filed for bankruptcy protection. One has since
liquidated. The model projects that in 1995, the 20 Walmart stores operating in
Massachusetts average sales of $207 per square foot and captured approximately $456
million or 20% of the estimated $2.3 billion in total sales of the eight major discounters.
Walmart's market share is then projected to increase to 41% by the year 2002. Over the
same time period, the market share of the remaining discounters in total is projected to
decline from 80% to 59% with a resulting projected "excess" of approximately 2.8 million
square feet of selling space by 1997. This should, in theory, result in the need to close up
to 35 stores to restore a balance between the supply and demand for discounter selling
space.
The analysis of the 100 shopping centers these discounters occupy in eastern
Massachusetts (not including the Cape and Islands) determines that the average discount
department store unit occupies 84,117 square feet of a 235,926 square foot community
shopping center with 1.48 additional anchor tenants. A total of approximately 23 million
square feet of shopping centers are occupied by these retailers. In 20 centers, totaling
approximately 2.2 million square feet, these stores represent the sole anchor tenant. In 53
of these 100 shopping centers, supermarkets are additional anchors. Brockton and
Danvers have the greatest exposure (400,000 or more square feet) to these retailers in
terms of gross selling space while in Milford and Chelmsford these retailers occupy greater
than 15% of the total retail market.
While little data is available, the historical reuse of vacant discount department store space
appears to have been largely by other department stores and supermarkets. Of the twenty
vacated units studied in this report, only six have been fully re-leased at this time. Three
were leased by other discounters, one by a supermarket and one by an off-price clothing
store and home goods store (the sixth tenant is not known).
Reuse of the subject space by current and future growing retailers in the region is difficult
to predict due to the rapidly changing environment of retail and the increasingly short life
cycle of both retailers and store formats. Nonetheless, among the most likely scenarios for
reuse are the acquisition of these regionals by Walmart or, more likely, Target Discount
Stores as a means to gain rapid market penetration of the region and reuse by an
expanding supermarket already occupying the center.
An important variable in this strategy, however, is the evolution of the supercenter, which
will likely dominate growth going forward. A supercenter consists of both a full line
department store and a grocery store and dictates the immediate need for a minimum of
110,000 square foot stores with 60,000 square foot expansion ability for the grocery
component. This implies that newer, larger (100,000+ square foot) stores with the ability
to expand will be the likeliest to be reused in the near future. The hardest hit discounters
and shopping centers will be in the rural locations where Walmart is beginning to build a
dominating presence and where the likelihood of finding major replacement tenants is the
least. The older, smaller units in outpost locations will most likely be in the first markets
surrendered to Walmart and are more likely be downgraded in use, torn down or be
converted to non-retail uses.
One of the ultimate implications of the retail consolidation for landlords on both a national
and local level is the likelihood of fewer, and potentially stronger, tenants in the future.
This may result in the shifting of negotiating leverage to the tenants.' The slow or flat
sales environment resulting from the changing lifestyles and demographics of Americans
should limit the amount of rent retailers are willing to pay. Finally, the shortened lifecycle
of retailers and retail formats is likely to increase the risks of tenant turnover and quicken
the obsolescence of retail formats.
1 Ron Pastore, Aldrich, Eastman & WaItch
CHAPTER 2:
RETAIL INDUSTRY TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS/ NATIONAL LEVEL
Trends:
Most retail analysts agree that the difficult environment which retailers face today is the
result of several secular and demographic trends. These major trends include the fact that
consumers are growing older and more value conscious. The free spending baby boomers
of the '80's are now less focused on image (apparel) and more focused on finding good
values. This is a result of a greater preoccupation with saving, paying college tuition and
maintaining and improving their homes.
Low interest rates and the increasing emphasis on the home are contributing to the rapid
growth in sales of "big ticket" durable goods such as computers and other electronic
goods. The growth rate in U. S. households has slowed considerably due to a higher
percentage of the population being single. In the 1960's, 63% of households fit the
traditional mold of two parents and children. Today fewer than 25% of households fit this
mold2 . While population growth is an important determinant of food and drug demand,
general merchandise growth (including apparel) is more closely correlated with household
growth3.
2 Merrill Lynch, Shopping Center REITs, March 1996
3 Merrill Lynch, Shopping Center REITs , March 1996
Consumers are more time pressed than ever before, which dictates the need for
convenience and selection which are the cornerstones of the phenomenal success of the
"category killers" and explains an observed decline in the number of mall visits.
At the same time, the population is becoming increasingly multi-racial, multi-ethnic and
polarized economically. In 1973, 58% of U. S. households were considered the middle
class (as defined in 1996 dollars by income in the $25-75,000 range) while the percentage
fell to 48% in 1991 and is projected to be 39% in 2000. This has negative implications for
retailers catering to the white middle class and opportunities for retailers catering to the
growth in minority, low-income and high income consumers.
Response:
In response to these demand side changes, the high cost of real estate in malls and the
poor execution of most department and discount stores, the supply of retail formats and
economics of retailing have changed significantly over the past few years in many
significant ways. There has been a tremendous growth of value-oriented mass merchants
and category killers such as Walmart, Toys "R" Us, Circuit City, Home Depot,
Price/Costco and Bed Bath & Beyond which are able to offer low prices and huge
4 AEW: Retail Industry Trends
selections as a result of their highly efficient distribution systems, inventory control
systems and superior pricing leverage with suppliers.
Category killers match or beat their traditional competitors on commodity items and make
their profit on higher margin, lower turn items that a discount store cannot afford to carry.
They now account for approximately one-third of all retail sales. The top 20 firms
accounted for over $50 billion in sales in 1994 and opened 1,200 stores.5
The huge inroads "Category Killers" have made in the market share of hard goods
formerly held by department stores and other general merchandisers has resulted in
department stores having to re-dedicate themselves to apparel which, in turn, has taken
market share from smaller specialty stores. As a result of the success of these new
formats, profit margins in all segments of retailing are under extreme pressure. This, in
turn, has resulted in a flurry of bankruptcy filings and failures of regional retailers which
do not posses the advantages of the national "value" retailers and generally lack the capital
to renovate enough stores to convert to more successful formats. In 1995, no fewer than
seven discounters with combined sales of more than $6 billion, were forced to file
bankruptcy.6 Of those, four are currently in liquidation. In 1995 a record 2,700 stores
closed nationally. 7
5 Stores: November, 1995
6 Goldman Sachs: U.S. Research "The Discount Industry: Three's a Crowd", April 30, 1996
7 Forbes "The Year the Stores Closed Their Doors", February 1996
Due to this extreme competition and price pressure, the life cycle of retailers and formats
has shortened considerably. As Carl Steidman, chief economist at Management Horizons
explains: "It took 100 years for the department stores to hit maturity, 10 years for the
warehouse stores. Now it's just 5 to 6 years for a new concept to get tired".8
Implications:
The retail industry is in the midst of a consolidation process. Not too long ago, the
differences in performance between the best players and second best players were minor
with the difference between great results and good results at stake. Today the differences
between retailers are often extreme with the differences between the best and second or
third best determining survival. For example, in 1985 both Walmart and Kmart had sales
of $165 per square foot. In 1995, Walmart's discount stores (including supercenters)
performed at approximately $300 per foot while Kmart was at $144 per foot.9 Similarly,
Home Depot performs at over $380 per foot while Kmart's failing Builders' Square
concept produces in the $200 per foot range.
The chart below lists shows several basic performance and financial ratios about several
category dominant national retailers.
8 Forbes : "Big Boxes. Too much of a good thing?", May 1996
9 DLJ: "Category Killers: Still The Best Retail Investment", April 1996
10 Merrill Lynch "Shopping Center REITS", March 1996
Table 1 FINANCIAL RATIOS OF CATEGORY KILLERS
STORE SIZE SALES/ SALES GROSS GROSS GROSS STORE
(SQ. FT.) STORE PER SF PROFIT/ PROFIT MARGIN OPER
($ MILL) STORE PER SF PROFIT
PETsMART
AUTOZONE
GENERAL NUTRITION
HOME DEPOT
OFFICE DEPOT
STAPLES
OFFICE MAX
WALMART
(SUPERCENTER)
WALMART (DISCOUNT)
PRICE/COSTCO
LOWE'S
BORDERS
BED BATH & BEYOND
CIRCUIT CITY
COMPUSA
BARNES & NOBLE
TOYS 'R' US
BEST BUY
SPORTS & RECREATION
25,000 $ 5.8
6,500 $ 2.3
1,800 $ 0.5
103,000 $ 40.0
30,000 $ 10.5
20,000 $ 7.5
23,500 $ 7.5
188,000 $ 75.0
110,000 $ 30.0
130,000 $ 85.0
115,000 $ 35.0
30,000 $ 9.3
42,000 $ 9.6
33,000 $ 23.0
26,000 $ 40.0
26,000 $ 7.2
46,000 $ 11.0
58,000 $ 50.0
48,000 $ 8.4
$ 232 $ 1.3
$ 308 $ 1.0
$ 289 $ 0.2
$ 388 $ 11.0
$ 350 $ 2.6
$ 375 $ 1.9
$ 319 $ 1.8
$ 399 $ 16.1
$ 273 $
$ 654 $
$ 304 $
$ 310 $
$ 229 $
$ 697 $
$1,538 $
$ 275 $
$ 238 $
$ 862 $
$ 175 $
7.2
9.4
8.4
2.6
4.0
5.6
5.4
2.2
3.4
7.3
2.8
AVERAGE 55,884 $ 24 $ 432 $ 5 $ 98 26.3% $ 1.7
Source: DLJ Category Killers (4/96) and Discount Store News (6/96)
As is evident from the above chart, these companies operate in a wide variety of store
sizes. As a group these stores report sales productivity which is vastly superior to more
traditional mall and community based retailers when compared to national averages.
53
147
101
107
88
96
77
86
65
72
73
86
96
171
208
84
73
125
58
23.0%
41.5%
35.0%
27.6%
25.0%
25.7%
24.0%
21.5%
24.0%
11.0%
24.1%
27.9%
42.0%
24.5%
13.5%
30.5%
30.7%
14.5%
33.0%
0.9
0.4
0.1
4.0
0.9
0.7
0.6
4.9
2.4
3.9
2.5
1.0
1.1
1.4
1.9
0.7
0.9
2.5
0.7
Table 2: MEDIAN STORE SIZE AND SALES PER S/F
MEDIAN MEDIAN
STORE SALES
SIZE PER SF
Top Category Killers (above Sample) 55,884 $ 432
Community Shopping Centers (National) 160,000 $ 212
Discount Department Stores (National) 56,000 $ 155
Discount Department Stores (Top 20 Metro) 60,000 $ 187
Source: DLJ: Category Killers Rest: ULI/Dollars and Cents of Shopping Centers 1995
By all measures, the sample of category killers' average sales productivity is at least twice
that of the median shopping center tenants.
The chart below shows evidence of the overall consolidation and increasing concentration
(as evidenced by market share) of retailers in each industry segment on a national level.
Table 3: NATIONAL MARKET SHARE OF TOP RETAILERS
1995 SALES
($BILLIONS)
1995
SALES
GROWTH
MARKET
SHARE
TOP 3 COS.
HOME
IMPROVEMENT
OFFICE SUPPLY
CONSUMER
ELECTR.
COMPUTER
FURNITURE
SPORTING GOODS
TOYS
BOOKS
MUSIC
DISCOUNT STORES
$ 131.7
$ 80.0
$ 60.0
74.0
32.0
$ 32.0
19.0
18.9
12.0
120.0
6.4%
5.0%
4.5%
15.0%
0.0%
4.0%
0.0%
7.0%
4.0%
0.0%
18.8% HOME
DEPOT
9.9% OFFICE
DEPOT
16.6% CIRCUIT
CITY
10.8% COMP USA
N/A
6.5% SPORTS
AUTH.
21.0% TOYS 'R' US
21.2% BARNES &
NOBLE
N/A
80.0% WALMART
LOWE'S HECHINGER
OFFICE
MAX
BEST BUY
BEST BUY
HELIG-
MYERS
SPORTS &
REC.
STAPLES
THE WHIZ
TANDY
ETHAN ALLEN
SPORTMART
BORDERS CROWN
TOWER TRANSWORLD
KMART TARGET
$ 579.6
Source: DLJ: Category Killers (4/96)
SEGMENT TOP
COMPANY
2ND
COMPANY
3RD
COMPANY
On a national level, in many retail segments, one or two clear winners have emerged with
the third company in retreat and closing stores.
For example, in Home Improvement, Home Depot and Lowe's are the dominant
companies. Hechinger's Home Quarters stores are generally unable to profitably compete
in markets in which Home Depot or Lowe's has a strong presence (including
Massachusetts) and, as a result, are closing stores and retrenching."
Consumer Electronics is another segment where one or two winners will emerge. Circuit
City is the dominant national company. Best Buy, the second largest firm has experienced
a significant decline in gross profit margin. The Whiz, is a relatively dominant regional
player in the New York area but does not have a national presence as of yet.
Walmart is the dominant national discount store chain. Target is the third largest
discounter but clearly the second strongest. Kmart is the second largest in terms of stores
and sales but is clearly losing the battle against Walmart and Target, and was considered
by many industry professionals likely to file for bankruptcy until it showed some modest
improvement in the first two quarters of this year.
" Forbes: "Goofus and Gallant", December 1995
CHAPTER 3: RETAIL INDUSTRY TRENDS IN EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS
Introduction:
Eastern Massachusetts has experienced a pattern of consolidation and emerging dominant
national firms similar to that occurring on a national level. The local effect of the growth
in category killers on regional department stores as well as general merchandisers has been
widely felt as is evidenced by the chart below.
Table 4: Massachusetts Business Failures
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Department Stores 1 2 6 4 3 0 5 4
Misc. General Merchandise 0 0 3 3 1 4 5 0
Household Appliance 1 1 4 4 6 1 5 5
Radio, TV, Consumer Electronics 2 3 5 5 11 7 2 2
Totals 4 6 18 16 21 12 17 11
Source: Dunn & Bradstreet
In this chapter, a summary of the regional home improvement, consumer electronic and
discount department store segments will be described. Then a more detailed look at the
financial performance, market presence, and competitive outlook of the regional
discounters and Kmart is presented.
Home Improvement:
The Massachusetts area was dominated by Grossman's, and to a lesser extent, Somerville
Lumber until the mid '80s when national firms, predominantly Home Depot entered the
market. Home Depot has rapidly become the dominant player with 13 stores and together
with the presence of Home Quarters (5 stores) resulted in the bankruptcy and liquidation
of nearly all of Grossman's operations. Somerville Lumber was acquired by Payless
Cashways and has closed all but 7 stores. Home Depot then focused its competitive
attention on Home Quarters, locating several stores virtually next to existing Home
Quarters (In Danvers, Framingham, and Shrewsbury). Home Quarters has since stopped
expansion in the area and is rumored to be exiting the market.
Consumer Electronics:
In this segment, Lechmere, a subsidiary of Montgomery Ward, was traditionally the
strongest local player with approximately 11 locations in eastern Massachusetts. Over the
past 8 years, Circuit City has established an equally strong presence and currently has 13
locations. The result has been the closing of two weaker companies, Highland
Superstores, and Fretter Superstores, which had as many as 12 location at its peak in the
late 80's.
Discount Department Stores:
The department store segment of the retail industry in the eastern Massachusetts region
has been historically dominated by regional chains. The largest discount retailers are
Bradlees (Braintree, MA), Ames (Rocky Hill, CT) and Zayre, which merged in the late
'80s, and Caldor (Norwolk, CT). Rich's Department Stores (Salem, MA) is a small
regional chain. Stuart's Department Stores was an even smaller regional chain which went
out of business in 1995. Kmart is the only national chain in the region (other than the
failed WT Grant) until the arrival of Walmart in 1990. Kmart's presence in the region
peaked in the early 80's after which it closed several stores. The regional firms have
engaged in a spirited competition over the years without any one particular firm
dominating the market.
This relative equilibrium all changed in the early '90s with the entrance of Walmart into
the region. Since 1990 Walmart has opened, 22 stores in Massachusetts, 14 stores in
eastern Massachusetts. While state level sales figures are not available, some real estate
practitioners believe that these stores have not achieved sales productivity comparable to
the company's national averages 12 They nonetheless have rapidly grown market share.
Based on a sales projection model which will be discussed below, Walmart may already
have become the region's second largest discounter behind Bradlees. The entry of
Walmart into this already intensely competitive region in the past five years has already
contributed to the bankruptcy and liquidation of one of the regions smaller chains, Stuart's
12 John McWeeney, Vice President of Development, Tedeschi Realty
Department Stores and the bankruptcy of the larger regionals (Caldor, Bradlees, Rich's).
The consolidation in discount stores is also evident from the following chart:
Table 5: Number of Stores/Discount Retailers in Massachusetts
TOTAL ALL
E=Est. WMT A/Z BR CAL KMT RICH'S A & H MAJORS OTHERS TOTALS
1989 - 51 35 25E 28E 11E 5E 155 115 270
1993 10 32 37 28 26 11 5 149 88 237
1994 14 31 37 28 25 11 5 151 82 233
1995 18 32 38 27 25 11 4 155 80 236
1996(PRO) 22 33 36 25 26 11 4 156 61 217
SOURCE: Annual Reports/Chain Store Directory
As is evident from the above data, as of 1995 there has been a 13% decline in the number
of discount stores in the state since 1988. With the closing of 13 Stuart's stores, two
Bradlees stores and two Caldor stores in 1996 and an estimate of seven additional smaller
stores, the total decline in stores since 1988 could be 20% or more.
Ames, Bradlees, Caldor, Kmart and Rich's were classified, for purposes of this thesis as
"distressed retailers" because each of these firms has each of these firms are either
operating in or recently discharged (Ames) from bankruptcy with the exception of Kmart.
Kmart and Ann and Hope do not fit these categories but are included for reasons outlined
below.
Ames, Rocky Hill, CT:
Ames is a regional discount general merchandise chain of 302 stores operating in 14
northeast states. The company experienced financial difficulties in the early '90s after
their highly leveraged 1988 acquisition of Zayre. The Ames/Zayre combined company
totaled over 700 stores (75 of which were closed upon completion of the merger)13. After
filing bankruptcy in 1992, the company began closing additional underperforming stores
and eventually reduced its total store count by over one-half to 302 today. The company
emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and has shown some improvement in performance over
the past two years. However, the company continues to close underperforming stores
including 17 in 1996 (none in Massachusetts).
Ames recently completed the acquisition of eleven Jamesway stores in New Jersey and are
reportedly in discussions with Rich's Department Stores about acquiring several of their
stores. The store formats in Massachusetts range from 44,000 square feet to 93,000
square feet and average approximately 65,000 square feet.
Ames reported a loss of $1.6 million for the fiscal year ending 1/27/96 on revenues of
$2.13 billion. Sales declined by 1.0% from the previous year during which a net income of
$17 million was earned. The majority of the decline in net income was attributable to a
$20.9 million restructuring charge associated with the 17 store closings. Gross Margin
13 Ames, Investor Relations Department
and SG&A remained almost constant. At 1/27/96, the company reported assets of $506
million, liabilities of $423 million and a net worth of $83 million.
Although Ames has experienced some stabilization of performance over the past three
years, the company competes directly with Walmart particularly with respect to its
predominantly rural locations. This does not bode well for their long term survival.
Bradlees, Braintree, MA:
Bradlees is a regional discount general merchandise chain of 134 stores operating in eight
northeast states. It is the largest discount retailer in eastern Massachusetts in terms of
stores (37) and current sales level (based on an estimate of its Massachusetts sales).
Bradlees has had a major presence in the region since the early 60's.
Since the arrival of Walmart in the region, Bradlees has struggled to upgrade its stores and
has experienced a large deterioration in margins. In pursuing a self-described recent
strategy of "walking away from Walmart" Bradlees has increased its percentage of apparel
in its merchandising mix. While this strategy has the benefit of increasing the focus on a
higher margin product, it has predictably resulted in lackluster sales. The company filed
for bankruptcy protection in June of 1995.
The store formats in eastern Massachusetts range from 48,000-107,200 square feet with
an average of 89,630 square feet. Bradlees reported a loss of $207.4 million for the fiscal
year ending 2/3/96 on revenues of $1.78 billion. Total sales declined by 7.0% from the
previous year during which a net income of $5.3 million was earned. Comparable store
sales fell an alarming 14.0%. The majority of the loss was attributable to a 320 basis point
decline in gross margin, a $55 million increase in selling, general and administrative
expense and a $65 million restructuring charge associated with the 12 store closings.
At 2/3/96, the company reported assets of $799 million, liabilities of $844 million and a
net worth of negative $45 million. The company list $540 million in liabilities as "subject
to settlement under the reorganization case". For the first quarter ending 5/3/96, the
company reported a $53.7 million loss. Bradlees has completed the closing of 12 stores in
1996 (2 in eastern Massachusetts) and the opening of 3 new stores (one in eastern
Massachusetts: Danvers).
Bradlees is undoubtedly the weakest of the regional discounters. The company's sales and
margin trends are sharply negative and most analysts expect they will be forced to merge
or liquidate in no more than two or three years.' 4 While little actual data is available,
some local real estate practitioners believe that several of Bradlees leases, particularly on
older stores, have significantly below market rental rates. To the extent that this is
accurate, these leases are potentially attractive acquisitions for other end users.15 This
could ultimately result in a greater demand for the current locations if the company were
to liquidate (see Chapter on reuse).
14 Douglas Tigert, Babson College
15 John McWeeney, VP Development, Tedeschi Realty
Caldor, Norwalk, CT.-
Caldor is a regional discount general merchandise chain of 170 stores operating in ten
northeast and Mid-Atlantic states. Caldor was spun off by The May Department Stores in
1989. The company's stores are located primarily in urban and suburban areas with high
population densities. The company was considered one of the stronger regional chains
until it filed for bankruptcy in October of 1995.
In eastern Massachusetts, Caldor operates 24 stores ranging from 46,000 to 126,700
square feet with an average of 85,633 square feet. The company reported a loss of $301
million for the fiscal year ending 2/3/96 on revenues of $2.77 billion. Total sales increased
by 0.6% from the previous year during which a net income of $44.4 million was earned.
However, comparable store sales fell 5.2%. The majority of the loss was attributable to a
580 basis point decline in gross margin, a $93 million increase in selling, general and
administrative expense and a $171 million restructuring charge associated with the 12
store closings, lease rejections and write down of assets.
As of 2/3/96, the company reported assets of $1,174 million, liabilities of $1,137 million
and a net worth of $37 million. The company list $531 million in liabilities as "subject to
settlement under the reorganization case". Caldor has completed the closing of 12 stores
in 1996 (2 in eastern Massachusetts) and the opening of 6 new stores (none in
Massachusetts). The company reports having rejected or terminated by agreement a total
of 26 leases to date.
All of the typical disadvantages which face the other regionals (i.e. lack of capital, less
efficient systems and technology) apply also to Caldor. However, some believe that Caldor
is the likeliest of the regionals to be acquired by Target or Walmart due to its large store
formats and the reasonably high productivity of its newer stores. 16
Kmart, Troy, MI:
Kmart is the nation's second largest discount general merchandise chain with
approximately 2,161 stores, including 87 Super Kmart Centers, operating in all fifty states.
Kmart has had a significant presence in the region since the 70's. Today the company has
26 stores in this state, 18 of which are located in eastern Massachusetts. 1995 was an
extremely difficult year for the company nationally as the margins of its discount
operations came under enormous pressure from the two strongest discounters, Walmart
and Target. In addition, Builder's Square, its home improvement subsidiary, reported an
operating loss of $387 million.17 Rumors of an impending bankruptcy filing have
dissipated in the first two quarters of this year as the company completed a major
refinancing of its debt and has seen some improvement in results. Nonetheless, the
16 John McWeeney, VP Development, Tedeschi Realty
17 1995 Annual Report
problems facing the retailing giant have not changed (i.e. low store productivity, severe
competition, margin pressure).
The store formats in eastern Massachusetts range from 48,500 to 114,000 square feet with
an average of 87,778 square feet. The company reported a loss of $571 million for the
fiscal year ending 2/3/96 on revenues of $34.4 billion. Total sales increased by 5.8% from
the previous year driven by a 4.3% increase in comparable store sales.
The majority of the loss was attributable to a 200 basis point decline in gross margin, a
$178 million increase in selling, general and administrative expense and a $171 million
restructuring charge associated with the store closings and the write down of assets. As
of 2/3/96, the company reported assets of $15.4 billion, liabilities of $10.1 billion and a
net worth of $5.3 billion.
Despite the recent improvement in the near term outlook for Kmart, the company's long
term ability to survive and compete effectively with Walmart and Target remains
uncertain.
Rich's Department Stores, Salem, MA:
Rich's is a privately owned regional discount general merchandise chain of 26 stores
operating in Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine. The company filed for
bankruptcy protection in March of 1996. In its bankruptcy filing it reported assets of
$63.4million and liabilities of $51.3 million. Little other financial information is available
due to the privately owned nature of the company. Based on bankruptcy court documents
the company is in the process of closing one store in Nashua, NH."
Based on its size and rural locations, it is unlikely that Rich's could survive in the long run.
Its rural store base is in direct competition with Walmart and like other regional chains
lacks the technology and capital to compete effectively. It is rumored that the company is
in discussions with Ames about selling some stores.
Ann & Hope, Cumberland, RI:
Ann & Hope is also a privately owned regional discount general merchandise chain. The
inclusion of this company in the group of "distressed" retailers which are the subject of
this thesis is not warranted in terms of actual financial data. It is included because, in
theory, it should be subject to the same industry pressures being experienced by the other
discount retailers. It operates 6 stores, 4 in Massachusetts and 2 in Rhode Island. The
writer has no knowledge of the company's finances other than a reported 1995 sales figure
of $295 million, which translates into an estimated sales per square foot of well over $200.
The company's Massachusetts locations are very large in relation to the other discounters,
averaging approximately 160,000 square feet. Based on its large store sizes and mall
locations (Liberty Tree, Arsenal, Seekonk) the company would appear to make an
attractive acquisition for Target.
The charts below summarizes some of the pertinent financial performance figures of seven
of the major discount department stores operating in the region in 1995 (Stuart's has since
liquidated). It is evident that the sales productivity and operating margins of these
retailers are significantly lacking in relation to the category killers ($434 SPSF average),
Walmart, Target and the national median for discount department store chains ($160
SPSF median).
Table 6: Financial
WALMART
TARGET
KMART
OTHER DISC (6)
TOTAL
BRADLEES
CALDOR
AMES
RICH's
STUART'S
Source: Goldman
Summary
1995 COMP
SALES STORES T
$ 54,330 5.0%
$ 15,800 5.6%
$ 26,779 5.6%
$ 23,899
$ 120,808 4.4%
$ 1,840 -14.0%
$ 2,766 -8.0%
$ 2,121 -1.0%
$ 90 N/A
$ 70 N/A
achs, Discount Store News
18 Bankruptcy Court Documents
OTAL
14.4%
16.2%
7.2%
-0.3%
-7.1%
0.6%
-1.0%
N/A
N/A
SALES
PER/SF
$ 297
$ 230
$ 144
146
163
113
130
102
5 YEAR
GROWTH
20.9%
14.1%
5.0%
4.3%
0.1%
11.3%
27.6%
N/A
N/A
GROSS
MARGIN
20.3%
25.5%
21.4%
27.6%
22.3%
26.6%
N/A
N/A
OPER.
INCOME
$ 5,194
$ 960
$ (181)
(122)
(28)
28
N/A
N/A
In terms of measuring market share and competitive strength one of the key indicators is
the increase in comparable store sales. Store openings can create overall sales growth
when comparable stores growth is flat or declining. The following graph shows the severe
decline of comparable store sales at Bradlees and Caldors. Kmart, on the other hand,
achieved comparable sales growth at the expense of profit margins which had a disastrous
effect on their bottom line.
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Figure 1: COMPARABLE STORE SALES INCREASES
Source: Goldman Sachs: U. S. Research
Finally, the bar graph below depicts the decline in sales productivity of Bradlees and
Caldor.
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Figure 2: SALES PER AVERAGE SQUARE FEET OF GLA
Source: Goldman Sachs: US Research
Summary:
Six discount department store chains which have a significant presence in eastern
Massachusetts are experiencing a sharp decline in comparable store sales and profit
margins and remain highly vulnerable to the growing presence of Walmart. The filing of
bankruptcy often "buys time" for retailers by allowing companies to avoid lease
obligations, compromise a substantial amount of trade and other unsecured debt and
emerge smaller and more competitive. Nonetheless, these firms continue to have long
term competitive disadvantages in terms of technology, inventory control, leverage with
suppliers and access to capital.
CHAPTER 4: POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS
RETAIL PROPERTY MARKETS
For the purposes of this thesis, "Eastern Massachusetts" will be defined as all areas of the
state east of and including the City of Worcester with the exception of Cape Cod,
Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket.
Overview of Eastern Massachusetts Retail Market:
In the opinion of several local real estate investors, the eastern Massachusetts retail
property market is very strong overall with a low vacancy rate in relation to most other
major metropolitan markets. The 1996 Finard & Company survey, which included over
116,000,000 square feet of retail space reported a vacancy rate of 7.1%. The Finard
survey encompassed virtually every square foot of retail space in 174 cities and towns in
eastern Massachusetts with the exception of the urban core of Boston, and the Cape and
Islands.
There are several fundamental reasons for the current health of this market. On the
demand side, the region enjoys high average per capita income in relation to national
averages.19 Most importantly, however, are the structural barriers to new supply. These
include, high land costs (in relation to national averages), lack of available sites and
perhaps most importantly, the high cost and lengthy permitting processes associated with
20development in the region. It was agreed by virtually all sources interviewed that this
last factor has resulted in the region traditionally being "understored" in relation to
21
national averages.
However, despite the current strength of the region's retail property markets, eastern
Massachusetts is and will continue to feel the effects of the ongoing national consolidation
of retail companies. Among the firms with a significant presence in eastern Massachusetts
that are most effected by the intense pressure on profit margins are the regional discount
department store chains and Kmart.
Table 7:1996 STORES AFTER COMPLETION OF SCHEDULED CLOSINGS
AMES BRADLEES CALDORS KMART RICH'S A & H TOTALS
Total Stores 302 124 170 2,316 26 6 2,944
Stores in MA. 33 37 24 26 11 4 135
Stores in E. MASS 22 27 20 18 9 4 100
Average Store Size 64,702 89,630 85,633 87,778 63,226 158,000 83,371
Store S/F in MASS 2,070,452 3,226,667 2,140,818 2,282,231 695,487 632,000 11,047,654
Store S/F in E. MASS 1,423,436 2,420,000 1,712,654 1,580,006 569,035 632,000 8,337,131
Sources: Finard & Company, NRB, Chain Store Directory
19 Craig Schmidt, Merrill Lynch
20 McWeeney, Tigert, Schmidt
21 McWeeney, Tigert, Schmidt
As the above chart depicts, these six discount retailers occupy approximately 11 million
square feet of selling space of which approximately 8.3 million is located in eastern
Massachusetts. Based on the Finard market estimate of 116 million square feet in eastern
Massachusetts and estimating an additional 10 million square feet of space within the
urban core of Boston and the City of Worcester (which were not surveyed by the Finard
survey), this space represents approximately 6.5% of the total retail space in this region.
Potential Store Closings and Vacancy:
The probability that a retailer in bankruptcy will reject its lease on a store is a function of
the profitability of that store to the firm. Lease obligations on unprofitable locations with
weak sales will be the first that a bankrupt retailer will seek to avoid. In bankruptcy, a
landlord receives a claim for only the lesser of one year of rent or one-third of the
remaining lease payments on a lease that has been rejected with the approval of the
22
court.
The two major variables therefore are sales volume and the economics of the lease. The
value of the location in terms of the efficiency of the distribution system is an important
variable, however it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
A long-term, below market lease contract is an asset to a retailer and may offset lower
than expected sales volume. It is also a transferable asset which can generally be sold to a
22 Annual Reports
third party. On the other hand, as a retailer's rent is typically less than 10% of sales (and
in many cases less than 5%) its value may not be enough to offset weak sales.24
1995 Massachusetts Major Discount Retailer Sales:
Store level sales figures for the subject retailers are unavailable to the general public as
they are considered proprietary information by both landlords and retailers. Similarly,
publicly-held retailers will not provide sales broken by state or geographic region.
As a result of the inability to directly analyze sales productivity at the store level, this
thesis uses an indirect approach to project the amount of retail space currently occupied by
troubled retailers that is currently "excess" selling space and therefore likely to become
vacant over the next six years. The steps used in this approach were as follows:
1) Estimate the current total Massachusetts sales of all major discount retailers;
2) Estimate the growth in Walmart sales/ market share;
3) Estimate the net sales remaining for the other major discounters;
4) Estimate the sales productivity of the other discount retailers needed to achieve an
"economic profit" or net operating margin of 4.50%; and
5) Project the reduction in the amount of selling space required to achieve a healthy
balance between total sales and selling space.
23 Annual Reports
24 Bill Beckeman, Managing Director, Finard & Company
Estimation of the Massachusetts sales totals of the various retailers is accomplished by
using company average sales productivity per square foot and multiplying this by the
selling space they occupy in the state. This methodology is likely to bear the best results
with the regional discounters which operate exclusively in the northeast (as any anomalies
attributable to the northeast are fully captured). This method is likely to be less accurate
with the national retailers, such as Kmart, which is generally considered to have higher
productivity stores in the northeast, and Walmart which believed to be experiencing less
25than average productivity to date in the northeast. Therefore, the national averages of
these retailers have been adjusted to reflect these peculiarities. The chart below
summarizes the data and assumptions used in this model.
Table 8: ESTIMATED MASSACHUSETTS SALES
($ million) 1995 Sales # Stor (1/95) Avg. GLA TOT GLA SALES/SF AVG VOL/
STORE
WALMART (excl. Sams) $ 456 20 110 2,200 $ 207 $ 22,770
KMART $ 402 25 88 2,363 $ 170 $ 15,450
CALDOR $ 363 26 86 2,226 $ 163 $ 13,960
AMES $ 235 32 65 2,070 $ 113 $ 7,338
BRADLEES $ 513 39 90 3,516 $ 146 $ 13,162
ANN & HOPE $ 181 4 158 632 $ 287 $ 45,346
RICH'S $ 90 11 63 695 $ 130 $ 8,219
STUART'S $ 70 13 53 689 $ 102 $ 5,406
TOTAL SALES $2,310 170 85 14,392 $ 161 $ 13,591
Source: DLJ, Finard, Discount Store News, Chain Store Directory
The model estimates the total 1995 sales captured by the eight largest discount department
store retailers in business in Massachusetts at approximately $2.3 billion.
25 Craig Schmidt, Merrill Lynch
Estimate of Walmart Sales:
The estimate used for Walmart's sales levels ($207 per square foot) is based on the
national average sales productivity of all its discount stores, weighted for the actual store
ages of its Massachusetts stores (see Table 9). For example, first year stores do an average
of $150 per square foot nationally. There were five stores less than one year old in
Massachusetts in 1995.
The weighted average for the 20 stores ($259 per square foot) was then adjusted
downward by 20% for the observed below average productivity the stores have
experienced in the northeast and adjusted upward by 5.0% until it reached the national
average by the year 2000. Using this approach, an estimate for 1995 sales of $456
million was reached.
26 McWeeney, Schmidt
Table 9: Estimated Walmart 1995 Store Productivity in Massachusetts.
STORE AGE SALES/SF # STORES 1995 SALES
('OOs)
Year 1 $ 150 4 $ 66,000
Year 2 $ 240 4 $ 105,600
Year 3 $ 264 3 $ 87,120
Year 4 $ 298 3 $ 98,340
Year 5 $ 336 3 $ 110,880
Year 6 $ 309 3 $ 101,970
Year7 $ 318 - $ -
Year 8 or older $ 323 - $ -
TOTAL SALES 20 $ 569,910
AVG STORE SALES 28,496
AVG SALES/SF $ 259
LESS REGIONAL ADJ. 80%
ADJ TOTAL SALES $ 455,928
ADJ AVG STORE SALES $ 22,796
ADJUSTED SALES/SF $ 207
SOURCE: DLJ: Category Killers (4/96)
The estimate used for Kmart sales was simply its national average of $144 per square foot
adjusted upward by 20% to reflect what is generally perceived as a regional anomaly for
their stores.
The next step was to project the growth in Walmart's sales over the next six years.
Assumptions also needed to be made about the growth in sales productivity (per square
foot) and the number of new stores opened annually. Walmart has slowed its expansion
into New England over the past year.28 This is generally believed to be due to a
combination of unexpectedly low sales productivity and high real estate costs. 29 As a
result, the assumption is made that Walmart will continue its slowdown in growth in the
27 Craig Schmidt, Merrill Lynch
28 Tigert, McWeeney
region, adding one store per year. It is assumed that Walmart' comparable store sales
increases also lags its national average of 5.0%. A growth rate of only 1.0% annually is
utilized in the first scenario. The resulting model output is summarized below.
Table 10: PROJECTED WALMART STORES, SALES, AND SALES/SF
($ millions) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
STORES 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
ADJ TOTAL SALES $ 562 $ 656 $ 755 $ 846 $ 887 $ 38 $ 988
AVG STORE SALES $ 26.8 $ 29.8 $ 32.8 $ 35.3 $ 35.5 $ 36.1 $ 36.6
AVG SALES/SF $ 243 $ 271 $ 298 $ 321 $ 323 $ 328 $ 333
Source: Model
The projected increase in Walmart sales is a function of the increase in the number of
stores, the increased productivity of the stores as they age, and the assumption that the
stores reach national productivity levels by 2000. The next step is to estimate the growth
in sales for all of the subject discount department stores for Massachusetts and subtract
out the projected Walmart sales to arrive at total sales for the all the other major discount
department stores. This sales figure is then divided by the total GLA to arrive at an
average sales per square foot figure.
29 McWeeney
TABLE 11: ALL OTHER MAJOR DISCOUNTER SALES, REQUIRED REDUCTION IN GLA, REQUIRED STORECLOSINGS
PROJECTED GROWTH IN SALES/SF
TOTAL DISC. DEPT STORE SALES
WALMART
ALL OTHER DISC. DEPT. STORES
AVG STORE GLA
TOTAL STORE GLA
AVG SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
PV SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
TOTAL STORE GLA
AVG SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
PV SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
SALES TO ACHIEVE
TOTAL SALES
MAY M A TA MFFT I
4.5% OPER. MARGIN
2,309,907
455,928
1,853,979
81.3
12,192
152 $
- $
12,192
152
3.0%
$ 2,379,204
$ 561,794
$ 1,817,411
83.1
11,216
162 $
162 $
11,216
162
162
3.0%
2,450,581
656,030
1,794,550
83.4
11,342
158 $
154 $
11,342
158
154
3.0%
$2,524,098
$ 754,634
$ 1,769,464
83.4
11,342
156 $
147 $
11,342
156
147
3.0%
$ 2,599,821
$ 846,250
$ 1,753,570
83.4
11,342
155 $
141 $
11,342
155
141
3.0%
2,677,815
886,968
1,790,847
83.4
11,342
158 $
140 $
11,342
158
140
3.0%
$2,758,150
$ 938,458
$1,819,692
83.4
11,342
160 $
138 $
11,342
160
138
3.0%
$2,840,894
$ 987,705
$ 1,853,190
83.4
11,342
163
137
11,342
163
137
$ 193
$ 1,817,411
9.417
197
1,794,550
9.116
201
1,769,464
8.812
$ 205
$ 1,753,570
$ 209
$ 1,790,847
$ 213
$1,819,692
8.540
$ 217
$ 1,853,190
A.526
.... ....... 
..................
............ - .......... 
........  
........ ..
.... .. ... 
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Other Major Discount Department Store Sales:
The 1995 average sales per square foot for the eight other discount retailers was estimated
at $152. Based on the model, this figure will increase sharply to $162 in 1996 despite the
fact that total projected sales for these discounters is projected to fall. This is the result of
the net reduction in selling space of approximately 850,000 square feet which represents
the elimination of the 13 Stuart's stores (689,000 square feet), the closing of the two
Bradlees stores in Shrewsbury and Westboro (123,400 square feet), and the closing of the
two Caldors stores in Brockton and Canton (174,515 square feet). Additions to selling
space consisted of a new Kmart in Plymouth (113,000 square feet) and a new Ames in
Lowell (51,650 square feet). The only other announced store opening of note is the
scheduled completion of the Kmart Superstore in Braintree in late 1996 (considered
1997).
The overall reduction in supply is projected to result in a $10 per square foot gain in sales.
This projected growth in sales is consistent with the rebound in sales growth of most
discount retailers experienced in the first two quarters of 1996.30 Assuming margins have
stabilized, this should result in a short term movement toward break-even sales levels.
However, based on this model, the projected sales growth will be short lived as the as the
increasing productivity of the maturing Walmart stores absorbs virtually all of the growth
30 Wall Street Journal, June 1996
in sales in this segment. The model assumes that store closings equal store openings from
1998 through 2002 for the purposes of measuring the effect of Walmart's increased
presence without a commensurate reduction in selling space by the distressed discounters.
As is evident from the output, sales levels immediately fall again in 1998 and continue
downward. Furthermore, adjusting these sales figures for inflation to arrive at real sales
per square foot shows an even sharper downward trend.
Required Reduction in Selling Space:
The implications of this analysis is that the approximately Imillion square foot reduction in
selling space which has occurred in '96 is not nearly enough of a reduction in selling space
given the reduced sales levels which the regional discounters are facing as well as their
need to further reduce selling space to achieve an economic return. The increasing
franchise presence and market share of Walmart will ultimately require that a much greater
reduction in selling space occur.
The first step in modeling this required reduction in space is to estimate the level of sales
required for the regional discounters to earn a normal or "economic" profit. This
economic profit is assumed to be an operating margin of 4.5% which is considered healthy
for the industry.3'
31 Walter Salmon, Harvard Business School
TABLE 12: REQUIRED SALES INCR @ CURR MARGINS w/FLAT SG&A
DISCOUNT STORE SALES
COST OF GOODS SOLD
GROSS PROFIT
LEASED DEPTIOTH OPER. INC.
SG&A
DEPRECIATION/AMORTIZATION
OPERATING PROFIT
INTEREST AND DEBT EXPENSE (NET)
IMPAIRMENT OF LONG-LIVED ASSETS
RESTRUCTURING CHARGES
INCOME TAX EXPENSE (BENEFIT)
NET INCOME
TARGET OPERATING PROFIT
REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT
1995 KMART
$ MILLIONS PER SQ FT
$ 34,389 $ 198
$ 26,966 $ 155
1995 BRADLEES
PERCENT $ MILLIONS PER SQ FT PERCENT
100.00% $
78.41% $
$ 7,423 $ 43 21.59%
$ 7,554 $ 43 21.97%
$ (131) $ (0.75)
$ 220
$ (351.0)
$ 1,548 $ 9
$ 1.679 $ 10
-0.38%
0.64%
-1.02% $
4.50% $
4.88% $
1,781 $ 146
1,289 $ 106
575 $
53 $
(122) $
47
4
(10.02)
25
99
65
(105)
(207.4) $
100.00% $
72.39% $
27.61%
0.79%
28.40%
32.30%
2.97%
-6.87%
1.42%
5.58%
3.65%
-5.87%
-11.65%I $
80 $ 7 4.50%
202 $ 17 11.37%
1995 CALDOR 1995 AMES
$ MILLIONS PER SQ FT PERCENTj$ MILLIONS PER SQ FT PERCENT
2,766 $
2,148 $
100.00. $
77.65% $
36 22.35%
698 $
61 $
(141) $
41
8
171
(60)
(301.0) $
124 $ 7
265 $ 15$
22.35%
25.23%
2.21%
-5.09%
1.48%
0.30%
6.17%
-2.16%
(17) -10.89% $
4.50% $
9.59% $
2,121 $ 113 100.00%
1,557 $ 83 73.43%
564
(30)
593
553
12
28
26.57%
-1.40%
27.97%
26.06%
0.58%
1.32%
1.14%
-0.29%
0.56%
(1.6) $ (0) -0.08%
95 $ 5 4.50%
67 $ 4 3.18%
.
The estimated improvement in sales required to achieve the desired operating margin of
4.5% is calculated by dividing the required improvement in operating profit (in dollars) by
the current gross profit margin. This is obviously a simplistic method as it assumes no
increase in selling, general and administrative expenses.
Table 13: REQUIRED IMPROVEMENT IN SALES (ASSUMING 1995 SG&A AND
MARGINS)
4.5% OPERATING MARGIN BREAKEVEN OPERATING
MARGIN
KMART $ 6,055 $ 35 $ 473 $ 3
BRADLEES $ 733 $ 60 $ 122 $ 10
CALDOR $ 1,187 $ 69 $ 141 $ 8
AMES $ 207 $ 11 $ - $ -
TOTAL $ 8,182 $ 736
AVERAGES $ 2,046 $ 44 $ 184 $ 5
SOURCE: Model
This model suggests that the discount department stores as a whole need to improve sales
per square foot by $44 from the current estimate of $152 to $196 to achieve a 4.5%
operating margin. This is consistent with some interviewees general belief that a store
performing at over $200 per square foot is a healthy store.32 Whereas a rough average of
$170 per square foot in 1993 was enough to assure the reasonable profitability of the
regionals, the significant deterioration in margins experienced in the past two years
dictates that sales today need to be sharply higher to achieve the same result.
32 Craig Schmidt, Merrill Lynch
The final calculation of the model is to project the required reduction in selling space
needed to meet the sales per square foot target, given the projected overall level of sales.
Again, the assumptions are simplistic in that the model does not attempt to factor in the
negative effects of store closings on franchise value. 3 Nonetheless, the model projects
that by 2002, a reduction in selling space of approximately 2.8 million square feet of the
roughly 11,000,000 square feet utilized today by discount retailers other than Walmart will
be required in order to achieve a healthy balance of supply and demand.
Sensitivity Analysis:
In order to test the sensitivity of the excess selling space to various growth assumptions
about Walmart, two other growth scenarios were considered. In the second scenario, a
4.00% growth in comparable store sales was assumed as well as increasing the regional
adjustment factor to 110% of the national average by 2001. These adjustments increased
the projection of excess selling space by approximately 1.0 million to 3.8 million square
feet by the year 2002.
In the third scenario, both a 4.00% growth in comparable store sales and the addition of 2
new stores per year were assumed as well as increasing the regional adjustment factor to
110% of the national average by 2001. These adjustments increased the projection of
excess selling space by approximately 2.0 million square feet over the second scenario to a
total of approximately 5.8 million square feet by the year 2002.
33 Goldman Sachs, U. S. Research:"Staying Power: How Long Can Retail Franchises Last?", April, 1996
TABLE 14: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Scenario 1:
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Reduction in GLA Store Closings
1,797,000
2,224,000
2,527,000
2,778,000
2,767,000
2,800,000
2,813,000
Scenario 2:
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Reduction in GLA Store Closings
1,883,000
2,425,000
2,811,000
3,136,000
3,400,000
3,725,000
3,758,000
Scenario 3:
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Reduction in GLA Store Closings
1,959,000
2,637,000
3,255,000
3,889,000
4,548,000
5,318,000
5,807,000
TABLE 15: SCENARIO 2: WALMART ADDS 1 STORE PER YEAR/4% COMP STORE INCREASES/REGIONAL ADJUSTMENT 80-110%
TOTAL DISC- DEPT. STORES 1995 1996 1997 1998 .,..1:999: 2000 2001 2002
PROJECTED GROWTH IN SALES/SF
TOTAL DISC. DEPT STORE SALES
WALMART
ALL OTHER DISC. DEPT. STORES
AVG STORE GLA
TOTAL STORE GLA
AVG SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
PV SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
SALES TO ACHIEVE 4.5% OPER. MARGIN
TOTAL SALES
MAX GLA TO MEET BREAKEVEN
$ 2,309,907 $
$ 455,928 $
3.0%
2,379,204
578,481
$ 1,853,979 $ 1,800,724
81.3 83.1
12,192 11,216
152 $
- $
3.0%
$ 2,450,581
$ 695,581
$1,754,999
83.4
11,342
161 $
161 $
3.5%
$2,536,351
$ 823,896
$1,712,455
83.4
11,342
155 $
150 $
$ 193 $ 197
$ 1,800,724 $ 1,754,999
9.330 8.915
3.8%
$ 2,631,464
$ 951,364
$1,680,100
83.4
11,342
151 $
142 $
$ 201
$ 1,712,455
8.52R
148 $
136 $
$ 205
$1,680,100
a82nfl
4.0%
$ 2,736,723
$ 1,078,096
$ 1,658,627
83.4
11,342
146 $
130 $
209
1,658,627
7 QoQ
4.3%
$2,853,033
$1,230,494
$1,622,540
83.4
11,342
143 $
123 $
213
1,622,540
7 AIA
4.5%
$2,981,420
$ 1,333,532
$1,647,887
83.4
11,342
145
122
217
1,647,887
7 4n0
TABLE 16: SCENARIO 3: WALMART ADDS 2 STORE PER YEAR/4% COMP STORE INCREASES/REGIONAL ADJUSTMENT 80-110%
PROJECTED GROWTH IN SALES/SF
TOTAL DISC. DEPT STORE SALES
WALMART
ALL OTHER DISC. DEPT. STORES
AVG STORE GLA
TOTAL STORE GLA
AVG SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
PV SALES/SF (ALL OTHER DISCT)
SALES TO ACHIEVE 4.5% OPER. MARGIN
TOTAL SALES
MAX OLA TO MFFT RRFAIKFVFN
$ 2,309,907 $
$ 455,928 $
$1,853,979
81.3
12,192
3.0%
2,379,204
593,067
$1,786,138
83.1
11,216
152 $
- $
$ 193 $
$ 1,786,138 $
3.0%
$2,524,098
$ 900,773
$1,623,325
83.4
11,342
3.0%
$ 2,599,821
$ 1,073,872
$1,525,949
83.4
11,342
3.0%
$ 2,677,815
$ 1,259,090
$1,418,726
83.4
11,342
3.0%
$ 2,450,581
$ 737,342
$1,713,239
83.4
11,342
151 $
147 $
197
1,713,239
8,703
159 $
159 $
3.0%
$2,758,150
$1,475,000
$1,283,150
83.4
11,342
143 $
135 $
135 $
123 $
125 $
111 $
3.0%
$ 2,840,894
$ 1,638,453
$1,202,441
83.4
11,342
106
89
$ 217
$ 1,202,441
c r"'"l
113
98
201
1,623,325
8.084
$ 205
$ 1,525,949
7.450
209
1,418,726
6.791
$ 213
$1,283,150
A 299
CHAPTER 5: POTENTIAL REUSE OF SPACE
A logical starting point for analyzing the potential reuse of the subject space is to examine
the characteristics of the shopping centers which are occupied by the subject retailers.
The ultimate reuse of this space may depend to a large extent on the tenant mix and other
characteristics of the shopping centers they are located in. For example, the effect on a
shopping center of the sole anchor tenant closing is likely to be more severe than losing an
anchor in a multi-anchored center.
Center Characteristics:
The data summarized below consists of the characteristics of the shopping centers
occupied by the combined 100 distressed discount stores in the defined eastern
Massachusetts region. The data was obtained from a combination of the Finard &
Company Retail database (approximately 85%), the NRB Shopping Center Directory for
locations not covered by Finard & Company (approximately 10%), and estimates based on
site visits when information from neither source was available (approximately 5%).
As is evident from the charts below, these retailers occupy the full spectrum of shopping
centers from neighborhood centers to super-regional malls. Nonetheless, the highest
concentration of the subject retailers (61%) are located in what are loosely defined as
community centers which typically have gross leaseable area between 100,000 and
300,000 square feet. The second largest concentration of these retailers are in regional
malls (17%).
Table 17: SHOPPING CENTER
SuperRegional
Regional
Community
Neighborhood
Unavailable
Total
Source: Finard, NRB
CONCENTRATIONS
CENTER SIZE
500,000+
300-500,000
100-300,000
0-100,000
# OF STORES
9
17
61
9
4
100
It is evident from the chart below that in 20 of the 100 centers studied (20%), the
distressed retailers are the sole anchor tenant. This has important implications for potential
store closings as the in line tenants of these shopping centers are generally dependent on
the drawing power of the anchor tenant for a significant share of their sales volume.
Table 18: ANCHOR CONCENTRATION
#OTHERANCHORS #OFSTORES PERCENT
3+ 13 13.0%
2.0 22 22.0%
1.0 44 44.0%
None 20 20.0%
Not Reported 1 1.0%
Total 100 100.0%
Source: Finard, NRB, Site Visits
PERCENT
9.0%
17.0%
61.0%
9.0%
4.0%
100.0%
These 20 single anchor shopping centers represent total space of approximately 2.2 million
square feet or less than 2% of the total market. The 77 multi-anchored centers represent
over 20 million square or roughly 15% of the total market.
Table 19: SQUARE FEET OF MULTI-ANCHOR AND SINGLE ANCHORED CENTERS
# centers Tenant Center Size % of # of oth
Size Center anch
MULTI ANCHOR CENTERS 77 6,434,276 20,483,341 31.4% 148
AVERAGES 83,562 266,017 1.92
SINGLE ANCHOR CENTERS 20 1,641,000 2,165,550 75.8%
AVERAGES 86,368 113,976
TOTAL 96 8,075,276 22,648,891 36.7% 148
AVERAGES 84,117 235,926 1.48
Source: Finard, NRB, Site Visits
Important to note is the fact that of the 77 multi-anchored centers, 33 are anchored by
supermarkets, another 20 by a supermarket and at least one other anchor. This suggests
both positive and negative implications.
Table 20: MULTIANCHORED CENTERS
#OF STORES PERCENT
SUPERMARKET ONLY 33 33.0%
SUPERMARKET & OTHER 20 20.0%
NONSUPERMARKET ANCHOR(S) 24 24.0%
NO OTHER ANCHOR 19 19.0%
Unavailable 4 4.0%
Total 100 100.0%
Source: Finard, NRB, Site Visits
On the positive side, the potential loss of one of the subject retailer should in theory be
less dramatic on a shopping center with multiple anchors than on a single anchored center.
In certain local shopping centers, an anchor retailer has been lost and the center appears to
remain healthy. For example, several centers which have closed Stuart's stores appear to
have remained viable centers even without re-leasing the empty space. For example, a
184,000 square foot shopping center at 700 Boston Road in Billerica has a vacant Stuart's
store at one end but appears to have remained a productive center with a J.C. Penney's
and Bob's providing the draw for the rest of the center. Similarly, a 132,000 square foot
shopping center at 199-215 Plain Street in Lowell has a vacant Stuart's at the far end but
appears relatively unaffected with a Stop& Shop, restaurant, health club and CVS
providing the critical mass of activity. This suggests that center's with a certain "critical
mass" of activity, can survive the loss of a discount anchor. In the above examples, two
other anchors provided the critical mass.
Supermarkets are also increasing the size of their prototype stores and in some cases have
34shown a desire to take a portion of the discounters space if it is contiguous to their own.
Net Properties has done this with a property in Westfield, moving a Finast supermarket
from its 27,000 square foot box to a 53,000 former Ames site.
On the other hand, the abundance of supermarket anchors already in occupancy of the
subject shopping centers eliminates a major potential source of replacement tenants
(supermarkets) for over half of the subject shopping centers.
34Cindy Taylor, Federal Realty Trust
35 "Changing Anchors, Changing Centers", Shopping Center Age December 1995
In the 100 center sample, there are also examples of how the loss of a discounter in a
multi-anchored center was a fatal blow to the center. For example, the loss of an Ames at
the Indian Head Center in Marlborough, the loss of Stuarts at the Taunton Mall and the
loss of an Ames at the Quintree Mall in Braintree. In all three cases, the loss of the
discounter led to the eventual closing of a second anchor and the crippling of the
respective centers. One can surmise that these centers were likely weaker at the outset
than the centers mentioned above and, as a result, couldn't withstand the loss of one
anchor.
A final observation of the space occupied by the subject retailers are the concentrations in
various towns, cities and malls.
Table 21: GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATIONS
SQ. FT.
Brockton 418,300
Danvers* 400,000
Boston** 282,109
Fall River 279,436
Saugus 271,500
Worcester (Est) 270,000
Milford 261,800
Leominster 253,900
Medford 221,625
Chelmsford 191,100
includes Bradlees on Peabody line
**includes Dorchester, Roslindale & Brighton
Source: Finard
Milford
Chelmsford
Danvers
Methuen
Raynham
Acton
Attleboro
Leominster
Brockton*
Woburn
% OF MKT
21.8%
16.1%
13.9%
13.9%
13.3%
12.7%
12.7%
12.1%
10.9%
10.6%
Brockton and Danvers have the greatest exposure in terms of total space while Milford
and Chelmsford have the greatest exposure in terms of the space as a percentage of total
retail space. Worthy on note, one Caldor store has already closed in East Brockton
bringing total vacancy in that market to approximately 15%. The potential vacancy in that
market if all of the subject retailers were to close would result in roughly a doubling of
vacancy. Danvers, on the other hand, has a relatively healthy current market vacancy of
5.1%.36
Reuse of Space: Historical Perspective
One logical method of predicting the future of the retail space in question is to study past
reuse of similar space after the failure and liquidation of various retailers. In several cases,
the discount retailers under study have closed several locations in the state most notably
Stuart's Department Stores and Ames/Zayre.
The following chart depicts several locations that have been closed by Stuart's,
Ames/Zayre and some of the other discounters, their current status and reuse.
36 Finard Data
TABLE 22: STUART'S DEPARTMENT STORES LOCATIONS
LOCATIONS: SQ. FT.
Billerica, 700 Boston Rd (Rte 3A) 33,140*
Brockton, 220 E. Ashland St. 46,312
Chelsea, 170 Everett Ave 84,000
Haverhill, 2 Water St 56,800
Lawrence, Essex St (Plaza 114) 50,133
Lawrence, Winthrop St 42,700
Lowell, 1200 Bridge St 51,657
Lowell, 199-215 Plain St 57,000
N. Bedford, Kings Hwy & Rte 140 55,800
Taunton Mall, 1 Washington St 80,000
Tewksbury, 1900 Main St 39,690
Worcester, 893 Grafton St 82,723
TOTALS 679,955
Average 56,663
*remaining space/partially leased
# Stores Percent
FULLY RE-LEASED 3 25.0%
PARTIALLY RE-LEASED 1 8.3%
VACANT 8 66.7%
Total 12 100.0%
Source: 1993 Boston Business Directory
The above chart lists 12 former Stuart's locations. Although no specific data was
obtained, it is estimated that most of these locations were closed approximately one year
ago. Three of the twelve locations have been fully re-leased. 1200 Bridge Street in
Lowell, a center with a supermarket anchor, was almost immediately leased to Ames. One
of the larger stores at 893 Grafton Street in Worcester was re-leased to a Building 19. A
third location in Brockton was released to a flea market. This indicates that some demand
for space exists from other discount stores. Also worthy on note, all three location that
were leased have supermarket anchors. Eight locations remain vacant with another
partially leased. However, the ability to generalize to the current retailers from the status
of the Stuart's locations is difficult due to the generally smaller size of the Stuart's units
and their locations in some poor performing malls (Mystic and Taunton Malls) and
otherwise in economically depressed areas (Brockton, Lawrence, and Lowell).
The chances of a category killer or other growth retailer wanting a Stuart's location
appears unlikely due to its tough locations and the age and configuration of the units.
Table 23: AMES & ZAYRE CLOSED STORES
LOCATIONS: SQ. FT.
Braintree, Liberty & Grove St 70,403
Braintree, Quintree Mall 82,691
Cambridge, 160 Alewife Brook Pkwy N/A
Fairhaven, 261 Washington St 70,000
Haverhill, 2 Water St 56,800
Marlboro, Farm Road & Rte 30 59,777
Roslindale, 630 Amer. Legion Hwy N/A
Roxbury, Warren St & MLK Hwy 40,000
# Stores Percent
FULLY RE-LEASED 3 37.5%
PARTIALLY RE-LEASED 1 12.5%
VACANT 4 50.0%
Total 8 100.0%
Source: 1993 Boston Business Directory
This table summarizes a sample of the Ames and Zayre stores on which some data was
available. The time elapsed since the stores closed in not known. Three of the eight store
have been fully leased. At Tedeschi Plaza in Braintree, the store was replaced by a
TJMaxx and Home Goods. At the Alewife Shopping Center in Cambridge both a former
Bradlees and Ames have been successfully replaced. At the Berdon Plaza in Fairhaven,
the Ames unit was replaced by a Shaw's supermarket which moved from across the street
in order to upgrade and expand its store.
In two cases, the closing of the Ames store has resulted in the closing of a second anchor
tenant and severely effected occupancy at the center. For example, at the Indian Head
Plaza in Marlborough, the closing of the Ames was followed by the closing of a Stop &
Shop. Only one tenant remains in the center which is approximately 25% occupied. The
second center is the Quintree Mall in Braintree. At this center, both an Ames and Stop &
Shop were closed. The center is approximately 20% occupied. Four of six in-line units
remain leased despite what appears to be very little activity at the center. Worthy on note,
the center has very poor visibility but is otherwise located in a high traffic count area on
Route 53 near the Braintree/Quincy line.
Two former Zayre stores, one in Roslindale and one in Dorchester have been vacant for
three years. Both centers in which they were located are over thirty years old, and appear
to be marginal locations.
There are also sporadic examples of store closings by the subject retailers. For example,
Caldor closed one store in 1994 when Federal Realty Trust bought out its below market
lease on a center in Norwell. The unit was then retenanted with a TJMaxx and Home
Goods. Caldor also canceled plans last Fall to open a new store in New Bedford which
was a former Ashmont Discount location. This store has since remained vacant..
Caldor recently won bankruptcy court approval to reject two leases on stores in Eastern
Massachusetts. One is a free standing store in East Brockton. The fact the store is
located across the street from a Bradlees and is located behind another shopping center
would appear to make this store difficult to lease. The second was a 89,000 square foot
store in the Village Mall in Canton. This is a 300,000 shopping center with a Marshalls
and Shaw's supermarket.
Since the store closed only one month ago, it is too early to analyze the effect of this
closing on this center.37 It will be an interesting example of the effect of a lost anchor and
potential reuse of the space. The center has two smaller anchors, and roughly fifteen in-
line tenants. The leasing agent expects lease renewals of the in-line tenants to be difficult
unless a new anchor can be secured.38
There are also a few examples of the reuse of Kmart stores. One is the Woburn Mall,
where the unit was leased to Lechmere. Another is in North Dartmouth where the store
was converted to a Builder's Square which is now vacant. A Natick store was leased by
Burlington Coat Factory and a store at the Tri-Borough Plaza in N. Attleboro was leased
37 Charles Chisholm, Leasing Agent, The Flatley Company
38 Charles Chisholm, Leasing Agent, The Flatley Company
to Shaw's. One recently closed store in Rockland remains vacant. The owner has
considered changing the use of the center to a non-retail use.39
Jamesway, another failed discount retailer which did not operate in New England, is a
relevant and recent example of a the failure of a discount department store chain operating
in largely rural areas and therefore is potentially applicable to Rich's and Ames locations.
The company operated 90 stores that averaged approximately 80,000 square feet that
were auctioned of this year by bankruptcy court. According to the auctioneer, Ames
purchased 11 leases, -approximately 65 leases were rejected and landlords bought back
approximately 7 leases.4
One property in New Jersey was subsequently leased to Walmart by the owner Mark
Center Trust. Mark Center reported that this unusual practice by Walmart was due to the
superior location of the property and the fact that the property configuration allowed for
an expansion of the unit to the desired prototype size.
As a final note, the Finard & Company survey which was completed approximately six
months ago, identified 13 empty units as former discount stores. At this writing, none of
these units has been leased.
39 John McWeeney, Tedeschi Realty
40 Keen Realty Consultants
Growing Retailers: Do they Want This Space?
The dominant category killers operating in New England today, such as Home Depot,
Walmart, and Circuit City have real estate strategies which almost exclusively involve the
construction of free-standing prototype "big boxes".4 1 The result has been that
approximately 80% of new retail construction in 1994 nationally was big boxes.42 When
these retailers lease a store in a shopping center, they appear to show a strong preference
for power centers over community strip centers.43
Home Depot has actually purchased and razed industrial properties in Waltham and
Framingham for sites to construct new stores. Their reported needs for very high ceilings,
substantially higher than average discounter space, makes their use of this space
prohibitively expensive.44
Warehouse/wholesale clubs such as Sam's (Walmart), BJ's (Waban) and Price Costco are
also growth retailers in the region, but, similar to the category killers, appear to desire
free-standing locations, high ceilings and their own box.
Best Buy is expected to make its entry into New England in the near future. While Best
Buy is typically aggressive in its expansion strategies, the current lack of capital being
41 Tarez Burns, Burns Associates
42 Forbes, May 1996
43 Douglas Tigert, Babson College
44 Douglas Tigert, Babson College
committed to the consumer electronic industry, the companies low stock price and
significant margin erosion over the past two years could slow this firm substantially.45
Potential Strategies of Walmart and Target and Implications:
Most category dominant retailers have the strategic goal of achieving market dominance in
relatively small markets such as the Boston area in order to maximize return on investment
and to justify expansion into a new market.4 6 Among the elements required in achieving
market dominance in a new market, are rapid growth and aggressive pricing. The ability
to achieve market dominance within the planned time frame is crucial. Failure to meet the
time frame objective typically results in large losses and potential financial disaster to an
aggressively expanding retailer.47
Both Walmart and Target are likely to follow a dominance strategy in New England.4 8
The implications of this strategy hold the key to the future of the regional discount
department store chains and the space they occupy.
45 Ron Pastore, AEW
46 John McWeeney, Tedeschi Realty
47 John McWeeney, Tedeschi Realty
48 John McWeeney, Tedeschi Realty
Walmart:
Several people interviewed believe that achieving market dominance in your own box in
the Boston region is nearly impossible due to New England's unique real estate
environment (Lack of sites, high land costs, political atmosphere). As evidence, they point
to Walmart's apparent inability to secure sites in or near the Route 128 beltway at prices
which fit its rent/sales ratio targets. This inability has apparently resulted in the selection
of a majority of rural locations further out in the Route 495 beltway. As stated previously,
It is also believed by that Walmart is experiencing store sales productivity significantly
below their national averages. These factors are believed to have resulted in a slow down
of Walmart's expansion plans into Massachusetts.
The regional discount chains do possess the "close in" locations that are attractive to
Walmart. Therefore, an argument can be made that the acquisition of one of the regionals
would be a logical way for Walmart to speed its penetration of the Boston market.
However, there are several real estate and business reasons that make this unlikely. First,
the vast majority of all new Walmart stores are new construction of Walmart's
"prototype" store. The protoype discount store is typically free standing and averages
110-120,000 square feet. Recently, Walmart has selected sites based also on the ability to
expand these stores an additional 60,000 square feet to accommodate the addition of a
60,000 square foot grocery store (together the stores are called "supercenters"). With the
recent decline in the growth rate of their discount store operations, the company is
reported to consider supercenters as a key to future growth in the United States. 4 9
Another reason, is that Walmart only occasionally will lease space in a shopping center.
The company prefers to own free standing locations. In eastern Massachusetts, Walmart's
only leased location in a shopping center is in Fairhaven. (McWeeney).
It appears, therefore, that the combination of the need for bigger
the desire to own rather than lease and their recent slow down in
England reduce the chance of Walmart acquiring on the regional
the immediate future.
and expandable stores,
expansion in New
discounters, at least in
Target:
Target on the other hand, is considered by more people in the industry to be likely to make
an acquisition of a regional chain.50 They are less invested in the supercenter concept with
plans to open only two new supercenters this year. Target's also has a greater focus on
apparel and, as a result, desires more of a presence in malls. Target has been reported to
be looking at several Bradlees and Caldor locations over the past year but has yet to
acquire any stores (Burns). Most industry observes don't expect Target to open their first
store in the region until late 1997 or 1998.
49 Goldman Sachs: U. S.Research
50 John McWeeney, VP Development, Tedeschi Realty
One of the more likely acquisitions for Target would be the acquisition of the four Ann &
Hope stores in eastern Massachusetts. These stores appear more than large enough to
accommodate the space needs of Target. The location of the stores in regional malls
(except for North Dartmouth) may also be a positive aspect as Target's product mix is
heavily weighted on apparel.
An alternative for Walmart and Target in their pursuit of regional discounters-is to wait
for a regional discounter to fail and bid for the leases on the strong stores. In relation to
an acquisition strategy this would result in the cost savings of not having to close the
acquire franchise's weaker stores. However, two disadvantages are also evident. The
first is the time lost in waiting for the regionals to emerge from bankruptcy and ultimately
file again. The second is the fact that bidding on the leases may become quite intense
between Walmart, Target, and the landlords especially where the subject lease has a
significant term left and is a below market rent (McWeeney). In this situation, the
landlord also has a big incentive to gain control of the lease, so that a market rent can be
negotiated. Apparently, several Bradlees leases are below market as a result of the
ownership of many of their shopping centers by Stop & Shop which owned Bradlees in
the late 80's.51
51 McWeeney
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS:
Two of the most frequently heard descriptions of the retail industry today are "over-
stored" and "consolidation". The most common explanations for these phenomenon are
that during the past decade, a more time-pressed, savings conscious, value-oriented, and
multi-ethnic America has demanded superior value and convenience from retailers
resulting in tremendous pressure on profit margins and record retail failures. Retailers
lacking access to capital, buying savvy, efficient distribution and inventory systems and
pricing leverage with suppliers are unable to compete with the Walmarts, Home Depots
and other "category killers" of the world which possess these advantages.
In the past, retail failures and store closings in the Boston area were looked at by retailers
and landlords alike as more of an opportunity than a problem, due to the area's historic
characteristic of being "under-stored". Retailers that were frustrated with the lack of
available space saw store closings as an opportunity to open new stores." Landlords
locked into long term leases which underperformed inflation saw the W.T. Grant failure in
the 70's as a godsend.53
The next cycle of failures and store closings is likely to have different implications for
landlords due to the evolution and consolidation of the industry. For example, three of
52 Philip Rosenberg, Treasurer, J. Baker
5 Robert McAlear, Vice Chairman, United States Trust
today's growth retailers in the region, Home Depot, Walmart, and Circuit City operate
almost exclusively out of their own free-standing "boxes".
The regional discount department store industry is consolidating rapidly and these
troubled discounters occupy approximately 8.2 million square feet of space in shopping
centers with a total of roughly 23 million square feet representing approximately 15% of
all the retail space in eastern Massachusetts. The potential for millions of square feet of
empty anchor store space is increasingly likely as Walmart continues to build market share
in the region. This analysis estimates conservatively that a minimum of 3 million square
feet of retail space in the state currently occupied by discount department stores other than
Walmart is "excess selling space".
The evolution of the supercenter, which will likely dominate growth going forward,
dictates the immediate need for 120,000 square foot stores with 60,000 square foot
expansion. The percentage of existing centers with distressed discount anchors and this
expansion ability is very limited.54 The likeliest potential reuse of existing space by a
single user appears to be Target Discount Department Stores (Dayton Hudson) expected
to enter the region in 1998. Supermarkets occupying these centers that desire to increase
their store size are also potential reusers.
To the extent that supermarket anchors already in occupancy of the subject shopping
centers do not need additional space and have "exclusive" lease clauses, this eliminates a
54 Douglas Tigert, Babson College
major potential source of replacement tenants for over half of the subject shopping
centers. This also creates contractual and tenant mix conflicts in the event that empty
discounter space is desired by a tenant for a supercenter.
To date, in only a very few cases has the loss of a discount anchor appeared to cause the
closing of the other anchor(s). Of the 20 closed stores researched, in only four locations
did the closing of an anchor store appear to trigger the closing of a second anchor and
severely impact the occupancy of the centers.
In 20% of the centers studied, the subject discounters are the sole anchors tenants;
This implies that future stores closings will have a significantly different effect on local
centers than past failures as the loss of an anchor in a single anchored center should in
theory have a greater impact on in-line tenants than the loss of an anchor in a multi-
anchored center;
The hardest hit discounters and shopping centers are likely to be first in rural locations
where Walmart is building a dominating presence and where the likelihood of finding
major replacement tenants is the least, such as western Massachusetts, Worcester County,
and other locations outside 495. These older and smaller units in outpost locations will
most likely be divided into multi tenant space, torn down or be converted to non-retail
uses. The better locations within routes 495 and 128 are more likely to be in demand due
to the lack of alternative sites and high cost of development.
A mitigant to these concerns is the perception that eastern Massachusetts is "under
stored" implying the consolidation in retail should have less of an impact in this region as
elsewhere in the country. The biggest, most modern stores in close in suburbs should be
in demand by Target and possibly Walmart. Many stores which were built twenty or thirty
years ago are believed to have below market, long-term leases and/or attractive option
periods which could make them attractive to bidders in an auction situation.
The dynamic of winners and losers has several implications for retail property markets.
The first implication is that retailers will have a greater incentive to close weak stores in
weak locations. This may lead to what most analysts foresee as a bifurcation of shopping
centers with the strong getting stronger and the weak getting weaker".
The flat sales environment and continuing downward pressure on margins should limit the
amount of rent retailers are willing to pay to landlords.se The trend toward fewer and
larger retailers with higher credit ratings should result in more negotiating leverage on the
side of tenants to dictate rent levels and project returns." Finally, the shortened lifecycle
of retailers and retail formats is likely to increase the risks of tenant turnover and quicken
the obsolescence of retail formats.
5 Merrill Lynch, Shopping Center REITs, March 1996
56 AEW: "Retail Industry Trends"
57 AEW: "Retail Industry Trends"
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National Research Bureau (Shopping Center Directory)
This company provides a survey of shopping centers of 10,000 sq. ft. or more consisting
of four or more tenants. The data is not considered to have a high degree of accuracy or
completeness. It is used in this report for data on centers when data from Finard &
Company or other sources was unavailable.
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